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ABSTRACT: This article explores the ways in which two international water agreements on the Yarmouk tributary to 
the Jordan River induce or impede transformation to equitable transboundary water arrangements. The 
agreements in question were reached between Jordan and Syria in 1987, and between Jordan and Israel in 1994. 
Following a brief review of theory and a summary of the body of knowledge on 'model' agreements, the article 
combines official river-gauging data with interviews and textual analysis to query the text and role of the 
agreements, particularly in relation to key dams and other infrastructure. Both agreements are found to i) lack 
important clauses that could govern groundwater abstraction, environmental concerns, water quality, and the 
ability to adapt to changing water quality, availability and need; and ii) include both ambiguous and rigid clauses 
that result in generally inequitable allocation of water and thus of the benefits derived from its use. Due to their 
omissions and to their reflection of the asymmetries in power between the states, both agreements are found to 
be 'blind' to existing use, to be incapable of dealing with urgent governance needs, and to impede more equitable 
arrangements. 
 
KEYWORDS: Jordan River, Yarmouk, transboundary water politics, water treaties, water agreements, hydro-
hegemony, Jordan, Syria, Israel 
INTRODUCTION 
Do international agreements promote or impede fair transboundary water arrangements? And, if they 
do, how do they do so? The people who live the effects of inequitable arrangements would benefit from 
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clear answers, as would the many activists, researchers and diplomats who are trying to improve the 
collaboration between states and their citizens on the sharing of water. 
Formal agreements have been hailed in established hydropolitical research and policy reports as proof 
of 'cooperative' arrangements, meaning that the treaties themselves are sometimes presented as the 
end goal (Wolf, 2007; FOEME, 2008; Brochmann, 2012; EcoPeace-INSS, 2018; Wang and Li, 2018). 
Investigators into the design and function of water agreements are beginning to question the degree to 
which the received wisdom holds (Zawahri and Gerlak, 2009; Gerlak et al., 2011; Zentner, 2012; Giordano 
et al., 2013; Lankford, 2013; Aggestam and Sundell, 2015; Dinar et al., 2015; Gerlak and Mukhtarov, 2015; 
Giordano et al., 2016; Krampe, 2016; GWH-SFG, 2017; Zawahri and Michel, 2018; Dinar et al., 2019). In 
fact, the exact opposite argument has also been advanced: that transboundary water agreements can be 
used to coercively achieve the outcome sought by the more powerful actor, just as readily as they can be 
used to encourage joint action or other more and less friendly forms of cooperation (Zeitoun et al., 2011; 
Zeitoun et al., 2016). 
This article answers the research questions by examining the two agreements reached over the 
Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River, while a companion article (The Yarmouk tributary to the Jordan 
River II: Infrastructure impeding the transformation of equitable transboundary water arrangements 
(Zeitoun et al., 2019b)) explores these questions in relation to the suite of infrastructure that the 
agreements have enabled. The agreements in question are the "Agreement concerning the utilization of 
the Yarmuk [sic] waters (with annex). Signed at Amman on 3 September 1987" (hereinafter referred to 
as the 1987 Syria-Jordan agreement or 1987 agreement), and the Yarmouk-relevant aspects of Annex II 
of the "Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" (hereinafter 
referred to as the 1994 Israel-Jordan Water Annex, or simply 'Annex II'). The Syria-Jordan agreement has 
received relatively little scrutiny (though see the very thorough Haddadin, 2002, and Wolf and Newton, 
2007), while quite contradictory evaluations have been produced by the many investigations of the Israel-
Jordan Water Annex, as will be discussed. Both agreements continue to shape transboundary water 
arrangements more than a quarter of a century after their negotiation, even as their static text stands in 
direct contrast to the ever-changing natural and political environment. 
This article is the first to evaluate the two agreements alongside each other, and to evaluate them – 
to the extent that it is feasible within data limitations – in relation to the hydropolitics of the wider Jordan 
River Basin. The article also departs from others in examining the extent of the influence of the 
agreements specifically in relation to 'equitable transboundary water arrangements'. Here, a 
transboundary water arrangement is understood to refer to the infrastructure, protocols, river basin 
commissions, and other formal and informal institutional structures that shape policy and the use of 
transboundary waters (primarily) between states (Zeitoun et al., 2019b); 'inequitable' arrangements are 
understood to mean those that lack measures that might ensure fairness (with 'fairness' being 
interpreted loosely as 'equitable and reasonable use' as it is put forward in International Water Law). 
The first level of analysis compares the text of the agreements against the growing body of peer 
reviewed research on model water agreements. The analysis is then deepened through a study of the 
perceived and actual violations of the agreements and the equitability of their allocation mechanisms. 
The data for this second cut of analysis comes from the published literature, from archives (French, 
British, Zionist), from interviews with key Jordanian and Israeli water resource managers, and from field 
observation, satellite imagery and all public hydrologic or hydraulic data available from Syria, as well as 
from Israeli pumping records and Jordanian river and canal-gauging records. 
While pumping and gauging records are presented with some degree of accuracy, the quality of this 
data limits the articleʼs findings to being only indicative. There is a particular lack of confidence in the 
quality of the gauging records, as noted in greater detail in the relevant sections. A further challenge to 
the analysis is its focus on a tributary of a wider basin. Isolating the Yarmouk tributary from the rest of 
the Jordan River Basin would be feasible if only flows and water use were being considered, but this is 
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not possible when international institutions and politics are also being investigated. The Yarmouk is not 
considered independently of the Jordan River by water resource managers (whether Syrian, Jordanian or 
Israeli), by International Water Law (which uses the wider basin as a unit of measurement), or by Annex 
II of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty. 
The clauses of the agreements are found to fall well short of those of a model agreement. This is due 
in part to the fact that the authors of the agreements could not benefit from the many advances in treaty 
analysis that have been made in the last few decades. Still, the omission of very basic clauses, considered 
alongside the presence of rigid, ambiguous and inequitable clauses, suggests that the agreements were 
designed in part to lock in the arrangement that had been established at the time of signing. The 
agreements are in effect 'blind' to much water use that would otherwise be considered violations of an 
equitable arrangement, and constrain transboundary management efforts. 
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT TRANSBOUNDARY WATER AGREEMENTS 
The transformation of an inequitable transboundary water arrangement to a more equitable and 
sustainable arrangement is understood in the manner of Lederach (2003, 2005), with an appreciation 
that conflicts are never truly resolved. The transformation from one form of arrangement into another is 
the result of processes of continuous interaction between the parties. As such, the conflict and 
cooperation that exist alongside each other (Mirumachi, 2015) can be transformed through alteration of 
the institutional and physical structures that sustain the arrangement, and this conflict/cooperation itself 
can initiate structural change (within, for example, the political economy, geopolitical or ecological 
systems). The resultant arrangement may be more equitable and sustainable according to the above 
definition, but it is not likely to be seen as such by all concerned – and some tensions are bound to remain. 
Disagreements over agreements 
Moving beyond the assumption that international water treaties or agreements are evidence of 
transboundary water 'cooperation' (see discussion in Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008), investigation into 
the design and function of water and environmental agreements reveals that there is a lot more to the 
picture. Large-N analysis of associations between treaties and politics suggests, for instance, that 
reaching a cooperative agreement "facilitates reconciliation in international rivalries", at least when there 
is great environmental attention, internal political stability, traditions of environmental cooperation, and 
existing processes of reconciliation (Ide, 2018). As such conditions are not present in the case at hand, 
insight may be shed by other studies that concentrate on the extent to which agreements reduce 
tensions. These find, for example, that the associated institutions can evolve with crises (Fischhendler, 
2004), and can produce a certain ability to generate "stress-management capabilities" (Zentner, 2012). 
Case studies of individual treaties offer yet further insight and nuance. One example is the influence 
of non-state actors on the negotiation of agreements between Canada and the United States (Norman, 
2012); another is the limited extent of the guiding role of the International Water Law on Nile water 
agreements (Abseno, 2013; Salman, 2014); yet another example warranting study is that of the problems 
arising from the inflexibility of negotiators on Indus water agreements (Zawahri and Michel, 2018). A 
more critical vein of hydropolitics explores how agreements are used to maintain transboundary water 
arrangements that favour the more powerful actors, as in the case of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement 
(Cascão and Nicol, 2016), the 1995 Mekong Agreement (Bearden, 2012), the 1995 Oslo II Accord between 
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (Selby, 2013), the Ganges Treaty between India and 
Bangladesh to share the waters of the Farakka Barrage (Thomas, 2017), and other treaties to share the 
water of the Zambezi Basin and the Mekong (Fox and Sneddon, 2007). Taken together, and as considered 
in greater detail in Zeitoun et al. (2019), these cases show how the (usually technocratic) structures and 
processes of international negotiations serve to set the parameters of the water deals that are reached. 
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Model water treaties and agreements 
The fact that the 1987 Syria-Jordan water agreement was the result of a renegotiation of the immediately 
postcolonial 1953 agreement confirms a well-known fact: that treaties are modified, ripped-up, or 
renegotiated whenever the political will to do so arises. An agreement can otherwise endure for decades, 
no matter how skewed or faulty. Fortunately, in these latter cases, legal and social science research into 
the effectiveness of transboundary water agreements provides guidance that may help the drafters to 
'get it right' from the outset. The guidance comes in the form of the recommended inclusion in 
sustainable agreements of a number of features or mechanisms, as presented in Table 1. The discussion 
following is limited to mechanisms that deal with allocation, accounting and uncertainty. 
Table 1. Some of the indicative features of a model transboundary water agreement.  
Features of a model transboundary water treaty 
Allocative mechanisms 
Based on 'equitable and reasonable use' 
Specific, rather than ambiguous 
Flexible, rather than rigid 
Technical mechanisms (related to, for example, conjunctive groundwater and surface water) 
Acknowledgement of surface water and groundwater as part of the same transboundary watercourse 
Adequate accounting for use, amount and quality of groundwater in reserve, and rate of 
replenishment 
Common identification, delineation and characterisation of transboundary groundwater 
Appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce the pollution of transboundary groundwater 
Comprehensive water accounting (including use, amount and quality of soil water, and gains made 
through improvements in irrigation efficiency/in the 'paracommons') 










Creation of multilateral bodies for information exchange or joint management 
Environmental and health concerns 
Water quality provisions 
Biodiversity, river base flows, etc. 
Source: Based on Hayton and Utton, 1989; UNECE, 1992; Rieu-Clarke et al., 2012; Zentner, 2012; Giordano et al., 2013; Tanzi, 
2013; UNECE, 2013, Dinar et al., 2015; Simons et al., 2015; Jafroudi, 2018). 
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The body of knowledge on water agreements finds, for example, that allocative mechanisms are more 
effective when based on a combination of water quality, use, need, and availability, rather than on 
availability alone as they have tended to do in the past. The UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention are the gold-standard guides in this regard, notably for their substantive principle of 
equitable and reasonable use (McCaffrey, 2008; Rieu-Clarke et al., 2012; Vink, 2014). In places where 
availability cannot satisfy demand, the conventions advise that prioritisation be negotiated on the basis 
of use, with domestic and drinking water, for example, being prioritised over industry use. 
Allocative mechanisms, furthermore, are found to be more effective if they avoid ambiguity in defining 
flows and uses. As Fischhendler (2008b) notes, ambiguity in the clauses allows negotiators to interpret 
them differently, meaning each can present the agreement in a favourable light to their head of state 
and compatriots. On the other hand, intentional ambiguity can lead to lowest-common-denominator 
outputs (thus potentially compromising a better agreement), or it can simply displace the more 
contentious issues. As Jägerskog (2003: 118) points out, "ambiguity is only useful when reaching 
agreement, and is problematic in the implementation process". The point is particularly apposite in 
relation to the 1994 Israel-Jordan water agreement, as discussed below. 
The literature further advises that allocative mechanisms should be flexible rather than rigid, in order 
particularly to reflect the variability in rainfall and water availability within or across the years (see, for 
example, Zentner, 2012, and Dinar et al., 2015). An agreement that specifies percentages of river flow 
makes for much easier compliance by all sides than one that allocates, for example, specific volumes, 
particularly in semi-arid basins with significant wet and dry seasons. 
To be effective, transboundary water arrangements should also incorporate all available sources of 
water, not least of all the groundwater which is often hydraulically linked with mainstream river flows.1 
While irrigation water that seeps into the soil or aquifers may be considered an indicator of inefficiency, 
these water flows often become available for use elsewhere (Perry et al., 2009; Gleick et al., 2011; 
Lankford, 2012). Water gains that are made as irrigation systems become more efficient are part of what 
Lankford (2013) calls the 'paracommons'. Reconceptualising the way that water is accounted for or moves 
around its cycle may further add transparency to the negotiations and therefore to the agreements (see, 
for example, Bastiaanssen et al., 2014; Bromwich et al., 2018; Abbott et al., 2019). 
Another identified component of effective transboundary water agreements is the ability to deal with 
and adapt to changes and uncertainty. In and around the Yarmouk, conditions are constantly changing. 
River modelling under different climate scenarios projects drops in precipitation in the basin (Al Raggad 
et al., 2018) and in the mainstream Yarmouk flow (Rajsekhar and Gorelick, 2017). The demand for water 
has increased with the dramatic rise in population, particularly in Jordan because of its hosting of millions 
of displaced Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian people (Hussein and Grandi, 2015). Examples of textual 
mechanisms that have been developed to allow treaties to accommodate such change include the 
revisiting clauses that schedule renegotiations after the passage of time, as found in the Columbia River 
Treaty between Canada and the US (Cosens and Williams, 2012); the amendable portions of an 
agreement, as exemplified by the minutes of the US – Mexico water arrangements (Milman and Schott, 
2010); and the escape clauses inserted to cover exceptional circumstances such as floods or acts of 
revolution (De Stefano et al., 2012; Dinar et al., 2015). 
The features of a model agreement can be discussed at length; it should be noted, however, that 
although these features are necessary they are not at all sufficient conditions for an equitable and 
sustainable transboundary water arrangement. All transboundary water arrangements are much more 
than their agreements, and the transformation of these arrangements requires deeper study at the 
                                                          
1 Soil water can be considered a further resource because of the substantial amount of food that is produced from it, especially 
in humid or tropical climates. Transpirated back to the atmosphere primarily through leaves, the main qualitative difference 
between soil water and groundwater or surface water is the fact that it is not shareable. It cannot be abstracted, treated, 
distributed or denied to anyone. 
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outset (see Zeitoun et al., 2019a). Still, the theory reviewed here suggests that the excluding or ignoring 
of most of the features of a model agreement is a symptom of inequitable transboundary water 
arrangements, ones which merit further investigation. 
DEVELOPMENT AND SHARING OF THE YARMOUK, WITHIN THE WIDER JORDAN RIVER BASIN 
This section reviews how Syria, Jordan and Israel developed, use and share the water resources of the 
Yarmouk tributary. The Yarmouk River (Figure 1) is the longest tributary of the Jordan River, running for 
over 140 kilometres. It flows from Jabal al Arab/Jabal al Druze, at an elevation of about 1700 metres 
above sea level (masl), to Baqura/Naharayim, at 200 metres below sea level, where it joins the lower 
main Jordan River (Al-Rubeai, 2004; UN-ESCWA/BGR, 2013). Approximately 80% of its 7000 square 
kilometre river basin (Al-Ghraibeh, 2008; Al Manaseer, 2012) lies inside Syria, including the Golan, which 
has been occupied by Israel since 1967, 19.7% of the river basin lies inside Jordan; and 0.3% is in Israel, 
not including the Occupied Syrian Golan (UEA, 2019a). In 2010, an estimated 1.6 million people lived in 
the basin (UN-ESCWA/BGR, 2013; Al Qusaym, 2016; CBS, 2016), though there are no reliable census 
figures and many thousands have been displaced since the start of the war in Syria in 2011. The basin 
also overlies a series of aquifers that span an area that extends beyond the hydrological border, notably 
the 'shallow basalt' and 'deeper limestone' aquifers in Syria, with the latter also referred to as the A7/B2 
Aquifer (Cr2cn cp/Cr2m-d) (Burdon et al., 1954; Ponikarov and Mikhailov, 1964; Hobler et al., 2001; 
Orient, 2011; UN-ESCWA/BGR, 2013; Margane, 2015; Al Raggad et al., 2018). Rainfall patterns are 
typically Eastern Mediterranean, with no rainfall at all during the summer months and roughly 200 and 
400 millimetres falling primarily in the winter months (Burdon, 1954; Mourad and Berndtsson, 2011); 
reliable meteorological data does not exist, however, due to the lack of operational weather gauging 
stations. (For modelling, see Shentsis et al., 2018b). 
Development and use of surface water and groundwater flows 
There is considerable disagreement over what is taken to be the normal flow rate of the river, as it is 
clearly affected by constantly changing surface and groundwater use.2 Between 1979 and 1988, the 
average flow of the Yarmouk, as gauged near its confluence with the Jordan River at Baqura/Naharayim, 
was 229 million cubic metres per year (Mm3/y) (JVA, 2016). Roughly 40 to 50% of this flow is estimated 
to have originated as groundwater (see, for example, Ionides, 1939; Shentsis et al., 2018a; also a 
discussion in UEA, 2019b). The average flow has dropped steadily since the late 1980s; between 2008 
and 2015 it was approximately 40 Mm3/y (HSI, 2016b), this low rate probably being due mainly to changes 
in water availability, surface water offtakes and groundwater abstraction in Syria and, to a lesser degree, 
in Jordan (Muller et al., 2016). While water managers in Jordan and Syria tend to agree that the amount 
of groundwater and surface water pumped out of the basin is greater than the amount that flows or rains 
back into it, the paucity of reliable gauging data means that it is not possible to estimate actual rates of 
over-abstraction. 
The bulk of the water abstracted is used for agriculture in the Hauran Plain (which is mainly in southern 
Syria, though extends into northern Jordan); to a lesser extent, the abstracted water is used in what is 
known as the Yarmouk Triangle, the land between the confluence of the Jordan and the Yarmouk, the 
Lake of Tiberias, and al Himmeh/Hamet Gader which is mainly in Israel. The abstraction comes through a 
suite of uncoordinated infrastructure elaborated upon in Zeitoun et al. (2019) and as shown in Figure 2. 
This includes thousands of wells in Syria and Jordan (Al-Husein, 2007; UN-ESCWA/BGR, 2013; Margane, 
2015), the Wehdeh Dam between Syria and Jordan, dozens of dams in Syria (discussed below), three 
                                                          
2 Early studies converged on an average flow (gauged at Adassiyeh) of approximately 450 to 480 Mm3 per year (Ionides, 1939; 
Burdon, 1954; Burdon et al., 1954; Baker and Harza, 1955; Energoprojekt, 1964), while flood flow alone was estimated at 226 
Mm3 per year (Ionides, 1939).  
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dams in Jordan, four Israeli dams in the Occupied Golan Heights, the King Abdullah Canal in Jordan (see 
Mustafa and Talozi, 2018), and the 'water exchange' infrastructure (which includes the Adassiyeh 
diversion weir) built between the Lake of Tiberias and the Yarmouk tributary by Jordan and Israel. 
Figure 1. Topographic map of the Yarmouk tributary basin, showing location of the Adassiyeh Weir and 
the Wehdeh Dam (in yellow), and 31 smaller dams within the hydrological limits of the basin.  
 
Note: Dams that are outside of the hydrological limit of the basin are also shown, as these are counted as inside the basin by 
some Syrian sources. 
Narratives and inequitable distribution 
The development of the Yarmouk is most accurately viewed from the political context of the wider Jordan 
River Basin, a context which has often been violent. Particularly from the 1950s onwards, there have 
been repeated military attacks, kidnappings, and several attempts to divert the river (Sosland, 2007; Wolf 
and Newton, 2007; Gasteyer et al., 2012). Since the signing of the water agreements, the conflict has 
been expressed primarily through a number of narratives that are tied to perceptions of the agreements. 
One of the main narratives heard in ministry and other governmental offices in Jordan is that "Syria 
violates the water agreement". This is accompanied by claims that Syria has built over 50 dams and drilled 
thousands of wells; it is often also accompanied by a sub-narrative that "Syria is using more than its fair 
share" (Hussein, 2017). A Syrian narrative that is less well investigated takes a different tack: "Jordan 
needs water because it committed to supplying too much to Israel through the 1994 Peace Treaty"; 
alongside this is a conviction that any additional flows provided to Jordan by Syria would in fact be used 
by Israel (Dana, 2016; Galili, 2016; Tawil, 2017; Serneel, 2018). 
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Figure 2. Sketch of the infrastructure in the Yarmouk tributary basin that is investigated in this article. Of 
direct relevance are the Syrian dams and the infrastructure that accomplishes the 'water 
exchange' between Jordan and Israel. 
 
One way to begin an evaluation of the extent to which the narratives hold is by considering how each 
stateʼs use of the waters of the Yarmouk and the Jordan compares to that of the others. This is shown in 
Figure 3, and references an estimate of the legal entitlement of each of the Jordan Riverʼs riparian states. 
The estimate comes from Qubaʼaʼs (2017) and Quba'a et al'.s (2017a) variation (+/-30%) on the weighting 
of each of the factors that the International Water Law suggests make up 'equitable and reasonable' 
shared, as guided by Rieu-Clarke et al. (2012). The same source provides a rough estimate of each stateʼs 
use of the Jordan River Basin, incorporating the use of groundwater.3 
Figure 3 seeks to address the previously noted challenge of analysing a tributary of a wider basin 
without isolating it from its legal, institutional and biophysical context. Taken from a UEA (2019b) 
analysis, Syria is estimated to use approximately 335 Mm3/y from the Yarmouk tributary basin,4 of which 
                                                          
3 The article did not investigate the number of wells or the estimates of groundwater use in the wider Jordan River Basin.  
4 A review of the literature provides other estimates of Syrian water use in the Yarmouk Basin. UN-ESCWA/BGR (2013: 197) cites 
the MWI (2014) figure of 453 Mm3/y, but this figure applies to the administrative (rather than hydrological) boundary of the 
Yarmouk, which includes all of Al Suwayda Governorate, some of which is outside of the hydrological basin. Of this total Syrian 
water use, 327 Mm3/y (of which 60% is groundwater) is used for agriculture, 92 Mm3/y is for domestic use (assumed to be all 
sourced from groundwater), and 34 Mm3/y is for industry (assumed to be all sourced from surface water). The figure of 165 
Mm3/y is derived from these figures and is accurate within the margins of error deriving from the above assumptions. The figure 
also closely matches the 180 Mm3/y given in Al Qusaym (2016) and Hoff (n.d.).  
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Figure 3. Indicative estimates of the use of Yarmouk tributary basin and Jordan River Basin flows, in 
relation to the range of legal entitlements for each Jordan River state in about 2012. 
 
Source: The estimates of legal entitlements of Jordan River Basin use are based on several secondary sources compiled in Qubaʼa 
et al. (2017b: Table 2). (See also Qubaʼa, 2017: Table 2.6). Estimates of Yarmouk tributary basin use are from numerous secondary 
sources processed in UEA (2019a) and as explained in the text. Notes: The range for legal entitlement reflects 30% +/- variation 
in weightings given to ten factors that comprise the calculation of 'equitable and reasonable use'; the Occupied Golan Heights is 
counted towards the legal entitlement for Syria and towards use for Israel; the numbers are indicative only, due to the limited 
reliability and compatibility of the data, as explained further in the text; YTB = Yarmouk tributary basin. 
approximately 170 Mm3/y is groundwater pumped from thousands of wells, and roughly 165 Mm3/y is 
surface water stored behind 32 dams. Jordan is found to use approximately 98 Mm3/y directly from the 
Yarmouk, roughly 32 Mm3/y of which is groundwater pumped from over 200 wells, and approximately 
66 Mm3/y is surface water diverted by the Adassiyeh Weir into the King Abdullah Canal (as will be 
discussed below). Since 1995, Jordan has also benefitted from an average of 47 Mm3/y of non-Yarmouk 
flows supplied by Israel from the Lake of Tiberias, according to the terms of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace 
treaty; Jordanʼs effective use of the Yarmouk, then, is roughly 145 Mm3/y. Israel is found to use 
approximately 56 Mm3/y of Yarmouk water, which includes the 35 Mm3/y used directly from the Yarmouk 
tributary via the Yarmoukim Reservoir (as discussed below), roughly 4 or 5 Mm3/y from the four dams in 
the Occupied Syrian Golan Heights (which have a retention capacity of approximately 10 Mm3/y), roughly 
2 Mm3/y from the wells on the Golan at Meitsar (HSI, 2016a: 352), and 14 Mm3/y of spring discharge at 
al Himmeh/Hamat Gader (HSI, 2016a: 353). 
Bearing in mind the difficulties of conducting a separate analysis of connected flows, Figure 3 reflects 
geographical features which are relevant to an analysis of the hydropolitical situation in the area. First, 
the Yarmouk flows are 'available' to different states in different capacities, with Lebanon and Palestine5 
having no access to the water of the Yarmouk tributary. Second, Syriaʼs use of the Jordan River Basin 
                                                          
5 'Palestine', here, refers here to the territories also known as the West Bank and Gaza.  
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(with water use in the Golan Heights counted as Israelʼs use) is solely within the Yarmouk tributary basin. 
There is a generally unequal distribution of Yarmouk water (with Syria using more than double the rest) 
and of water use across the Jordan Basin as a whole (with Israel using more than triple the rest). 
Moreover, Israel is using Jordan River flows at a level well beyond the most favourable interpretation of 
its legal entitlement, while Jordan is abstracting within its range of legal entitlement, and Syria, Lebanon 
and Palestine are using less than what might be considered their fair shares. The following sections 
address the extent to which this inequity is challenged or reinforced by the water agreements in question. 
THE 1987 SYRIA-JORDAN WATER AGREEMENT 
Like its predecessor in 1953,6 the main purpose of the 1987 Syria-Jordan water agreement was to 
establish the basis for the construction of a dam at Maqarin that would produce electricity and regulate 
river flows for irrigation and for "other Jordanian schemes" (Article II). As discussed in greater detail in 
Zeitoun et al. (2019), construction of the dam at Maqarin has been subject to the considerable ebb and 
flow of Jordanian – Syrian relations, as well as to Israeli efforts to prevent its materialisation (Sosland, 
2007). The dam – without its power-generating component – was completed only in 2006, and was 
renamed the Wehdeh (or Unity) Dam. 
To the extent that the 1987 agreement facilitated the construction of the dam, it can be considered 
both to have been successful and to be out-dated. But the agreement also suffers from a number of 
omissions and other weaknesses that suggest that it continues to impede the emergence of an equitable 
and sustainable transboundary water arrangement. 
Rigidity, omissions and allocation 
Apart from the 1987 agreementʼs clause specifying potential heightening of the Maqarin Dam "where 
such measures are technically and economically justified and agreed on by the two States" (Article VI), 
the agreement provides little scope for dealing with changed circumstances, including rapid or slower-
onset changes in water use and availability driven by war, weather or climate. 
The agreement calls for a joint Syria – Jordan Commission to implement its provisions, and advocates 
that disputes be resolved by finding "an objective solution" (Article IX); however, neither the commission 
nor the agreement itself can accommodate shifts in water use, whatever their cause. Such shifts may 
result from significant loss of territory, as followed from the Israeli occupation of the Golan in 1967; 
reduced water availability because of increased abstraction; heightened demand for water resulting from 
in-migration, notably to Jordan; the increased availability of alternative sources, such as the gains from 
increased water use efficiency; or wastewater reuse and desalination, both of which remain minor in 
Syria and Jordan but are significant in Israel (Feitelson and Rosenthal, 2012; Aviram et al., 2014). 
The 1987 agreement makes no mention of, or accounts in any way for, its impact on downstream 
users – a weakness commonly found in bilateral agreements on multilateral watercourses (not least on 
the Nile, as discussed by Cascão and Nicol, 2016). The agreement also has no monitoring clauses, no self-
enforcement mechanisms that might regulate unfulfilled clauses, and (remarkably) makes no mention of 
water quality or pollution. In fact, it expresses no concern for the environment in any way and appears 
to be very much a product of the mindsets that dominated at the time it was originated in the 1950s (see 
discussion in Giordano et al., 2013). 
The sole mention of groundwater is found in Article VII, which specifies that Syria "retains the right to 
use of the water of all springs welling up within its territory in the basin of the Yarmuk [sic] and its 
tributaries, with the exception of the waters welling up above the dam below the 250-metre level". The 
                                                          
6 Of interest is the American draft Jordan–Syrian water agreement of 1952, which appears to be the basis of the 1953 treaty 
originally signed (see FO, 1952: 42). The 1952 draft is much more specific than the 1953 agreement that was signed – for example, 
it quantifies flows – and avoids the 250 masl benchmark altogether. 
Water Alternatives – 2019  Volume 12 | Issue 3 
Zeitoun et al.: The Yarmouk River agreements  Page | 1074 
agreementʼs elevation-based allocation mechanism and neglectful treatment of groundwater is 
problematic for three reasons. First, considering that all of the springs that are captured in Syria lie above 
250 masl (UEA, 2019), the article appears designed to ensure the continuation of the Syria-favouring 
regime of water use that had been established before the agreement was signed. Second, the lack of 
limits placed on groundwater abstraction is also a hindrance because of the direct hydraulic connection 
between the shallow basalt aquifer and the surface water flow or spring discharge. This hydraulic 
connection means that pumping from wells can diminish surface water flows, at least in the Hauran Plain 
if not in the deeper gorge where a fault creates a largely impermeable barrier at the border. The third 
problem with the agreementʼs poor treatment of groundwater is political. A strict interpretation of the 
text could be used to argue that Syria would have to limit the depth of the withdrawal levels of its wells 
to above 250 masl. A related argument could insist that the letter (if not the spirit) of the agreement 
obliges Jordanian wells to extend below 250 masl, meaning some of the existing Jordanian production 
wells are not covered. 
Apart from the elevation-based mechanism to allocate flows, Article VII of the agreement lumps 
together the distribution of benefits and of water. This specifies that the electricity the dam was meant 
to produce would be split between Syria (75%) and Jordan (25%), but that Jordan would bear all the costs 
of construction and maintenance. Article VII further states that Jordan be given "the right to use the 
overflow from the Wehdeh Dam reservoir".7 Because the dam was originally intended to generate 
electricity, the overflow referred to was in the form of expected releases after the production of 
electricity and following the abstraction of an unspecified volume of water by Syria for irrigation or 
domestic consumption. By way of the 1987 agreement, then, Jordanʼs entitlement is ambiguously limited 
to the flows in the Yarmouk mainstream that are released from the Wehdeh Dam, which are themselves 
defined by a very specific clause about dams and surface water use. 
In response to claims of inequity and to requests from the Jordanian government, the Government of 
Syria agreed to a series of additional releases of water for Jordan between 1999 and 2002. The relatively 
small volume freed up over this period (about 8 Mm3 in total) contrasted starkly with the great amount 
of publicity generated (KUNA, 1999; al Farawati, 2001; UEA, 2019a). The Syrian releases, furthermore, 
were based on a request, not founded in an international agreement; they have also not been repeated 
since. 
No violations but no governance: Omissions and rigidity impeding an equitable arrangement 
The filling of the Wehdeh Dam is restricted by Article VI: 
Jordan shall undertake to design and build the Wahdah [sic] dam to a total height of 100 metres including 
floodgates, in order to store the waters flowing into the Yarmouk river after the filling of the reservoirs of the 
Syrian dams which are specified with their storage capacity in the annexed table (emphasis added). 
The dams referred to are the very subject of the Jordanian violation narrative previously discussed. The 
table in question lists the names and storage capacities of 26 dams (which have a total storage capacity 
of 134 Mm3).8 Extensive satellite imagery analysis conducted by the Water Security Research Centre of 
the University of East Anglia (UEA, 2019: Annex B) identifies 32 dams built in Syria (outside of the 
                                                          
7 As an interesting historic footnote, the arrangement is similar in this sense to the 1922 Franco-British agreement that specified, 
among other things, that the "runoff not used by Syria" would flow to Palestine (FNA, 1921, 1940). 
8 This does not include two dams (al Rumi and al Butm) which are mentioned in the table but are not counted as contributing to 
the filling of the Wehdeh Dam as they are located on the Raqqad tributary, which enters the Yarmouk downstream of the 
Wehdeh Dam).  
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Occupied Golan),9 as shown in Figure 1, with an estimated total storage capacity of 197 Mm3. This 
suggests that Syria has thus built six more dams with 63 Mm3 more storage capacity than each state had 
agreed to, and that the Jordanian narrative of Syrian violations of the agreement reflects reality to a 
certain extent. 
Because of siltation, pollution, redundancies and rainfall variability, however, the actual retention of 
water by the dams is considerably less than their design capacity (Avisse et al., 2017; UEA, 2019). It is 
therefore not likely that the 26 Syrian dams specified in Annex B have ever been consistently filled to 
their capacity, with some estimates of their actual stored volumes being as low as 20 to 40% of their 
official capacity (SANA, 2015, 2016). Furthermore, because Article VI stipulates that the filling of these 
dams is a precondition for the operation of the Wehdeh Dam, it could be argued that the capacity – if 
not strictly the number – of dams is in compliance with the terms of the agreement. 
The findings thus challenge the allegations of violations expressed in the Jordanian narrative of 'syria 
violates the agreement', but there is a further message to consider. As is the case with lack of regulation 
of groundwater abstraction, water quality or environmental flows, the text of the agreement offers no 
incentive or mechanism to either side to even coordinate the construction of the additional dams (not to 
mention boreholes). While there may be no violations of the agreement, it also provides little governance 
and locks in the distribution of use that is so apparent in Figure 3. 
It is not insignificant, furthermore, that the omissions, inflexibility and inequity all work in favour of 
the more powerful actor. Refraining from a hydro-hegemonic reading of the situation – which would 
investigate why Jordan agreed to the terms of a clearly skewed agreement – a relevant conclusion is that 
the obstacle to a more equitable arrangement is not the alleged Syrian violations of the agreement, as 
the narrative contends, but is the agreement itself. 
THE 1994 ISRAEL-JORDAN WATER ANNEX 
The water clauses that prescribe the water sharing arrangement between Jordan and Israel are found in 
Annex II of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Because Annex II does not separate the Yarmouk flows 
from the broader Jordan River Basin flows, this articleʼs investigation into its influence over the wider 
Israel-Jordan transboundary water arrangement treads a fine line: it must neither over-attribute the 
importance of Yarmouk-related findings nor interpret them as divorced from the wider basin and political 
context. 
Contradicting evaluations 
With almost no fully endogenous water resources and having consented to a constraining agreement 
with Syria six years earlier, the peace treaty provided the Government of Jordan with a doubly important 
opportunity to secure greater use of water resources. Annex II has been heralded for how it secured 
Israeli recognition of Jordanian "rightful allocations"10 following decades of contestation and violence 
(see, for example, Al-Kloub and Abu-Taleb, 1998; Shamir, 1998; Haddadin, 2002; Shamir, 2003; Wiczyk, 
2004; Meisen and Tatum, 2011; Choudhury, 2017; Yasuda et al., 2017). A further virtue of the Water 
Annex is its consideration of water quality, which is intended to protect the resource against pollution. It 
proposed, for example, treatment of the saline spring flows diverted from the Lake of Tiberias (Article 
III). Annex II also has relatively strong institutional mechanisms that i) specify a six-month warning period 
on any projects that might affect the other signatories, ii) establish a Joint Water Committee, and iii) 
propose that committee as the forum for discussion of prevention of harm and mitigation of adverse 
                                                          
9 The analysis of satellite imagery also identifies four dams built by Israel within the Yarmouk tributary basin on the Golan, with 
an estimated storage capacity of 10 Mm3. Israel has built considerably more water infrastructure on the Golan, which is inside 
the Jordan River Basin but outside the Yarmouk tributary basin (Dajani, 2018).  
10 As stated in the main text of the treaty, though not in the Water Annex. 
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effects of any project. It is also forward looking, in the sense that it holds a promise that both sides 
develop an additional 50 Mm3/y for Jordan (Art. I.3). 
Critics of the Israel-Jordan water agreement argue that its lack of consideration for downstream 
Palestinian water use means Jordan effectively consents to, and legitimises, the pre-emption of any form 
of Palestinian self-determination (Baim, 1997; Kubursi et al., 2011; Talozi et al., 2019). The large number 
of 'creative compromises' made by Jordan have furthermore been considered to be well short of the 
(1950s US-led diplomatic) 'Johnston allocation' that the state had long been lobbying for (Sosland, 2007: 
175), and may be related to what Wine (2019b) sees as being a disproportionate gain by the Israeli 
agricultural sector. Noting that the compromises have served to achieve gains in other spheres – not least 
of all political peace with and security from a former enemy – other analysis questions whether a better 
deal could not have been reached (Beaumont, 1997) or implemented during times of drought (Feitelson, 
2000; Jägerskog, 2003). Indeed, and as discussed below, Annex II also suffers from omissions, rigidity and 
ambiguous distribution mechanisms that call into question the equitability of the Israel-Jordan 
transboundary water arrangement, particularly with regard to the Yarmouk tributary. 
Omissions and ambiguous allocation 
Apart from the lack of consideration of Palestinian water use, the Water Annex also lacks adequate 
consideration of groundwater. Article IV mentions groundwater in relation to Israel maintaining (and 
increasing) its pumping from inside Jordanian territory at Wadi Araba (well outside the Jordan River 
Basin). However, the Water Annex conspicuously ignores the hydraulic connections and ongoing 
conjunctive management of groundwater with surface water within the Jordan River (Zeitoun et al., 
2009), not to mention the Yarmouk tributary basin. Annex II also provides little scope for dealing with 
changed circumstances, be these border adjustments due to conflict (e.g. Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank, Gaza, and southern Lebanon),11 reduced water availability, increased demand because of 
population fluxes, or increased availability of alternative sources such as wastewater reuse and 
desalination (as previously discussed). The Water Annex, furthermore, makes no mention at all of 
biodiversity and does not include a self-enforcement mechanism that might regulate clauses that are not 
fulfilled. 
The omissions are straightforward to interpret, compared with the extensive ambiguity of many of 
the other clauses of Annex II. Fischhendler (2008a) details the way in which this ambiguity allowed the 
negotiators of each side to present the treaty favourably. From the wider Jordan River Basin the most 
extreme Israeli accounting would see Israel conceding (only) 35 Mm3/y to Jordan, while the most extreme 
Jordanian accounting would see a concession of 245 Mm3/y (ibid). Al-Kloub and Abu-Taleb (1998: 165) 
claim, for instance, that the treaty "guarantees to Jordan about 215 Mm3/y", a figure repeated in Al 
Majdoub (1998). 
An initial assessment of the several clauses allocating the Yarmouk flows, as shown in Table 2, suggests 
that the Yarmouk portions of the agreement are also highly ambiguous and very specific. 
From the Yarmouk flows alone, then, Annex II stipulates 25 Mm3/y for Israel (Art. I.1a,b), 20 Mm3/y 
for Jordan (Art. I.2b), and excess flood water to be available to both parties.12 But Annex II does not so 
much allocate the Yarmouk flows as detail the terms of the 'water exchange' between Israel and Jordan. 
                                                          
11 Though Annex I of the 1994 peace treaty states, in relation to borders, that  
[t]he boundary line shall follow natural changes (accretion or erosion) in the course of the rivers unless otherwise agreed. 
Artificial changes in or of the course of the rivers shall not affect the location of the boundary unless otherwise agreed. No 
artificial changes may be made except by agreement between both Parties. 
12 The temptation to compare directly with the figures of Yarmouk use from Figure 3 should be resisted, as the Water Annex is 
not limited to the Yarmouk tributary.  
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Table 2. Summary of clauses from Annex II of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty that are relevant to 
Jordanian and Israeli use of the Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River.  
Yarmouk-related clauses 
Israel is:  Jordan is:  
To pump 25 Mm3/y from the Yarmouk (12 Mm3 
from 15 May to 15 October, and 13 Mm3 from 
16 Oct to 14 May) (Art. I.1.a,b) 
Entitled to store and use a minimum average of 20 
Mm3 (from 16 October to 14 May) of "the floods" 
in the Jordan River "south of its confluence with 
the Yarmouk" (Art. I.2b) 
To pump an "additional 20 Mm3/y" from the 
Yarmouk (Art. I.1b), and to transfer this back to 
Jordan per Art. 1.2a (see next column) 
To receive 20 Mm3 (from 15 May to 15 October) 
from Israel (from "directly upstream from the 
Deganya gates", meaning the Lake of Tiberias), and 
assume all related operations and maintenance 
costs (Art. I.2a) 
Entitled to maintain its current uses of the 
Jordan River waters from the confluence of the 
Yarmouk and the Jordan, to the northern border 
of the West Bank (Art. I.2c) 
Entitled to a quantity equivalent to Israeli use of 
the Jordan River downstream from the confluence 
of the Yarmouk and the Jordan to the edge of the 
West Bank (Art. 1.2c) 
Jordan and Israel further agree: 
To build the Adassiyeh Weir (on the Yarmouk) in order "to improve the diversion efficiency into the 
King Abdullah Canal of the water allocation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and possibly for the 
diversion of Israelʼs allocation of the river water" (Art. II.1). 
That both sides can use the "excess floods" that are not used by Jordan during the winter period (i.e. 
20 Mm3, referring to Art. I.2b).* 
That both sides can use the "excess flood water" downstream of the Adassiyeh Weir, after Israel takes 
the above-mentioned 25 Mm3/y (Art. I.1c).* 
 
* In relation to the flood flows, Israel agreed in a separate addendum of 10 March 1998 to allow Jordan an 
additional 40 Mm3 of storage, so, 60 Mm3 total (see Haddadin, 2002: 438). 
Non-Yarmouk-related clauses discussed briefly in this paper 
Israel is:  Jordan is:  
To retain (and increase pumping from) its wells 
inside Jordan in the Wadi Araba (Art. IV.1,3) 
Entitled to 10 Mm3/y of desalinated salt springs 
diverted by Israel away from Tiberias (Art. I.2d) 
Jordan and Israel agree: 
To "cooperate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional quantity of 50 Mm3/year of 
water of drinkable standards" (Art. I.3). 
Originally conceived in the 1940s (see Hays, 1948), the rationale was to store winter flood flows from the 
Yarmouk tributary in the Lake of Tiberias, where they could be used instead of flowing unused into the 
Jordan River and from there to the Dead Sea; in return, water would flow from the Lake of Tiberias to 
Jordan for use in the Jordan River Valley during the dry summer months. The influx of fresh river water 
further dilutes the salinity of the lake, which remains until this day an important source of drinking water 
for Israel. A more complete evaluation of the extent of influence of the Water Annex thus requires 
scrutiny of this 'water exchange' and of who uses how much of the excess flood water. 
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The Yarmouk – Tiberias 'water exchange' 
This section, in order to query the flows that make up the 'water exchange', interprets the relevant data 
available from the (Jordanian) Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), the (Israeli) Jordan Valley Water Authority 
(JVWA), and the Hydrological Service of Israel (HSI). The datasets are presented in Table A.1, summarised 
in Table 3, and shown figuratively in Figure 4. 
Table 3. Summary of the distribution of Yarmouk tributary flows after Adassiyeh, showing the balance of 
the Yarmouk – Tiberias 'water swap' (in Mm3/y) within data limitations.  
a b c d h i 
Year ^Total flows diverted into 
the KAC, via sandbar/rock 
weir/ AW (including 
Mukheibeh Wells 
discharge and Wehdeh 
releases) ('alpha' flows) 
(JVA, 2016, 2019)* 
Flows 
bypassing 





Flows not diverted into 
the KAC, because they i) 
(before 1999) overspill the 
sandbar or rock weir; or ii) 
(after 1999) overspill or 
bypass the AW, ('beta' 
















105 37 94 / 65  





72 / 71.5  




69 / 48  






Sources: Jordan Valley Authority and Jordan Valley Water Authority, and as noted (see Table A.1 in Annex). 
Notes: Discrepancies are due to measurement error, poor reliability of the reported data, and non-calibration of different 
datasets, as discussed further in the text; AW = Adassiyeh Weir; YR = Yarmoukim Reservoir; KAC = King Abdullah Canal. 
*checked against JVA (2006) and a third JVA source. 
^Because of minor changes in the JVWA pumping and data-recording regime, the total pumping from the Yarmoukim Reservoir 
is not identical to the sum of pumping to Tiberias plus the pumping for local kibbutzim. 
For a number of reasons, the data presented is reliable only to an indicative degree. First, there are 
discrepancies that may be attributed to the fact that the Israeli and Jordanian datasets have not been 
calibrated or normalised in any way, which is an issue typical of international hydropolitics (see, for 
example, Milman and Schott, 2010; Jepson, 2014). A second weakness is the unreliability stemming from 
measurement error, particularly for the flood flows that overspill the Adassiyeh Weir and are gauged 
telemetrically by the JVA. Third, there are potential biases or inaccuracies in reporting. Though the 
research conducted for this article has not traced a cause for concern of bias, it remains a possibility that 
merits deeper investigation (Wine, 2019a). Moreover, reporting of both the long-term JVWA and JVA 
datasets has changed, for example, from seasonal years to annual, and from different gauging 
equipment. JVA data keepers also report that the JVA data is prone to duplication errors – with the same 
or similar data found on different datasets – and apparently contradictory labelling (Ghureir, 2018; 
Shattat, 2018). A fourth and final reason to consider the data in this section to be indicative only has to 
do with potential interpretation errors; whether in Arabic, Hebrew, or inconsistently translated English – 
and even though they have been checked several times by the authors – the datasets may have been 
misinterpreted. 
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Figure 4. The 'Yarmouk-Tiberias Water Exchange' of Yarmouk tributary flows between Jordan and Israel 
(in Mm3/y). 
 
Sources: As per Table A.1, (Jordanian) Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) and (Israeli) Jordanian Valley Water Authority (JVWA); data 
was cross-checked with datasets from the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) and the Hydrological Service of Israel 
(HSI). 
Notes: Includes heavy flood year of 2003; as noted in the text, the difference between the flows bypassing the Adassiyeh Weir 
and the flows pumped from the Yarmoukim Reservoir reflects data limitations and differences in the datasets. 
The division of the flows at the Adassiyeh Weir is attributed to its operation and design, as discussed in 
Zeitoun et al. (2019b). One of several relevant points of that article is the annual average of approximately 
72 Mm3/y of Yarmouk flows that have been diverted into the King Abdullah Canal between 1999 and 
2018 (Table A.1, Column b). This can be compared to the 69 Mm3/y that the JVA data gauges as the 
volume of water that it sent to Israel during the same time period through gates designed to bypass the 
weir (according to the terms of Annex II), plus the flood waters that overspill the weir (Table A.1, Column 
d) – see also Zeitoun et al. (2019b). 
In other words, the JVA gauges show that when flood flows are counted, the magnitude of water that 
enters into the King Abdullah Canal is roughly the same as the amount that bypasses it. As with the 
agreement itself, however, the design and operation of the weir is more complicated than that. JVA 
employees and operators of the weir testify that they seek to operate the gates to allow 1 m3/s to Israel 
(Ghureir, 2018; Ghantous, 2018); this is roughly 32 Mm3/y, or the equivalent of the 25 Mm3/y agreed to 
in Annex II (Art. I.1a,b) plus an additional approximately 22% to make up for potential losses from seepage 
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or evaporation (Ghureir, 2018). JVA records show that between 2003 and 2018 it has sent an average of 
37 Mm3/y to Israel through the gates at the Adassiyeh Weir (Table A.1, Column c), an amount which is 
approximately 50% more than it has committed to. 
The 'excess flood water' that overspills the crest of the weir is gauged at 69 Mm3/y on average (from 
1999 to 2018), and is referred to as 'uncontrolled water' (JVA, 2016, 2019; see also Zeitoun et al. (2019)). 
The flows are not uncontrolled for long, however; like the flows that bypass the weir, the water that 
overspills it returns to the Yarmouk riverbed, which at this point still forms the border between Jordan 
and Israel. The flow of the river is then interrupted across its breadth by an earth dam that allows 
pumping into the Yarmoukim Reservoir in Israel (see Figure 5). This reservoir has a storage capacity of 
750,000 m3, and has four pumps each with a capacity of 6500 m3/h (or a combined total maximum 
pumping capacity of 16,000 m3/h, as the design of the installation restricts pumps from operating in 
parallel) (Nathan, 2017a). Equivalent to 140 Mm3/y, this design pumping capacity means that all the flows 
that bypass or overspill the Adassiyeh Weir can be diverted into and pumped out of the reservoir, except 
in unusually wet years such (as 2003). As confirmed by an employee of the Jordan Valley Water Authority 
(the Israeli institution responsible for supplying water in the Yarmouk triangle): "Today, the Yarmouk has 
been diverted into that big pond. For all intents and purposes, that is the end of the Yarmouk" (Nathan, 
2017b). 
Data from the (Israeli) Jordan Valley Water Authority (Table A.1, Column h) shows that it pumps an 
average of 35 Mm3/y from the reservoir.13 The dataset shows that roughly 19 Mm3/y (Table A.1, Column 
f) of this is diverted to the Lake of Tiberias, while 16 Mm3/y is used for drinking water and irrigation at 
local kibbutzim in the Yarmouk triangle (Table A.1, Column g). 
JVWA pumping records thus confirm that the Israeli pumping of (on average) 19 Mm3/y to the Lake of 
Tiberias is in accordance with Article 1.1b of Annex II, which stipulates 20 Mm3/y. The records also 
confirm that its local use of (on average) 16 Mm3/y of Yarmouk flows is lower than the 25 Mm3/y 
stipulated in Article I.1a,b. On the other hand, Israel is the only side making use of the excess flood flows, 
in apparent contravention of Articles I.1c and I.2b. 
A second point to note is the average of roughly 47 Mm3/y that (Jordanian) JVA records show is 
pumped by Israel14 from the Lake of Tiberias to the King Abdullah Canal in Jordan (Table A.1 Column h); 
this is more than twice the 20 Mm3/y that Israel committed to in Article I.2b.15 Data from the Jordanian 
Jordan Valley Authority and interviews with staff indicate that these flows are accounted for from four 
different sources: i) the 25 Mm3/y promised by the then Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon to King 
Hussein in 1997 (labelled by the JVA as 'Additional')16; ii) a steady 10 Mm3/y labelled by the JVA as 
'Desalination' (in relation to Art. I.2d – see Table 2), though it is otherwise openly acknowledged to be 
fresh water from Tiberias; iii) additional flows (labelled 'concession') which are over and above the 1 m3/s 
(35 Mm3/y) that Jordan allows to bypass the Adassiyeh Weir through the gates, and which vary between 
2 and 20 Mm3/y); and iv) the water Jordan purchases from Israel which is labelled by the JVA as 'sold 
water', an amount that, theoretically, is as much as 20 Mm3/y but which in practice varies from 0 to 16 
Mm3/y) (JVA, 2006; Abed, 2017; JVA, 2017; Shattat, 2018). 
                                                          
13 There are several reasons for the difference of 39 Mm3/y between the flow gauged by the JVA as bypassing or overspilling the 
Adassiyeh Weir (75 Mm3/y) and the flows gauged by the JVWA as pumped from the Yarmoukim Reservoir (36 Mm3/y): the 
difficulty of accurately measuring the flood flows that overspill the weir, inconsistent and uncalibrated gauging records between 
Jordan and Israel, and seepage and evaporation. However, the difference is judged as being significant enough to warrant further 
investigation.  
14 These flows are pumped by the national water company (Mekoroth), not by the JVWA.  
15 The 47 Mm3/y may also be considered to be part of the additional 40 Mm3/y that Israel agreed to provide in the March 1998 
addendum (see footer of Table 1 and Haddadin, 2002: 438), though is counted by the JVA otherwise (see text), and has not been 
investigated further. 
16 Sharon’s promise of 25 Mm3/y may be in partial fulfilment of the "additional 50" Mm3/y of Article II, Para 3 (see Shamir, 2003: 
12). 
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Figure 5. The 'end of the Yarmouk'. Top: the Yarmoukim Reservoir showing the diversion and termination 
of the Yarmouk. Bottom: the reservoir and the motors of the four pumps. 
 
 
Source: Top: adapted from Google Earth; bottom: authors, 2018. 
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Omissions, rigidity and ambiguity impeding an equitable arrangement 
The details of the Yarmouk – Tiberias water exchange and the method of accounting of flows reveals a 
number of features that cast doubt on the equitability of the Yarmouk features of Annex II of the 1994 
Israel-Jordan peace treaty. The first feature to note is the apparent Israeli contravention of Articles I.1c 
and I.2b in relation to excess flood flows, and other non-Yarmouk clauses.17 There are also several other 
notable features that relate to the flows pumped by Israel to the King Abdallah Canal. First, the 10 Mm3/y 
of 'desalinated' water (Art. 2.2d) is actually freshwater from the Lake of Tiberias; second, the 0-16 Mm3/y 
of water purchased by Jordan is an economic arrangement not covered by Annex II; and third, the 25 
Mm3/y water promised by the former Defence Minister is not as resilient to political changes as are the 
clauses of an international treaty (in the same way that the previously discussed Syrian releases of water 
to Jordan were not impervious to political changes). Furthermore, the method of accounting casts doubt 
on the fulfilment of the only clause that specifies water pumped to Jordan (that is, the 20 Mm3/y of Art. 
I.2a), not to mention the additional 40 Mm3/y agreed to in the 1998 addendum (see Table 2), as this is 
not accounted for by the JVA. 
For the rest of Annex II, the omissions and ambiguity favour the more powerful actor, just as the 
omissions and rigidity do in the 1987 Syria-Jordan water agreement. As previously discussed, the 
ambiguous clauses allowed both sides to present the Water Annex as an achievement, with one 
interpretation seeing Israel 'concede' (only) 35 Mm3/y to Jordan (Fischhendler, 2008a). Considering Israeli 
use of the Yarmouk in the Occupied Syrian Golan (not covered by Annex II), and its control and sole use 
of 'excess' flows from the river, Israeli use of the Yarmouk has actually increased since the agreement 
was signed. By contrast, Jordan's effective use of the Yarmouk is 145 Mm3/y, which is roughly half of the 
maximum 'concession' from Israel that has been claimed (given that the Water Annex secures no other 
volumes for Jordan outside of the Yarmouk), and much of this is not enshrined in the text. Nestling the 
analysis into the wider Jordan River Basin, it is noteworthy that Annex II also omits Palestinian rights of 
use and has been perceived to legitimise the heavy skew in use towards Israel (Figure 3) as well as Israeli 
water use in the Occupied Golan. Considered alongside its almost complete neglect of groundwater and 
biodiversity and its inability to accommodate changes in water availability and needs, the conclusion is 
that Annex II impedes the transformation of the Jordanian – Israeli transboundary water arrangement. 
THE AGREEMENTS ARE OBSTRUCTIVE 
The Yarmouk agreements are far from being models 
As the evaluation of the Yarmouk agreements against the model in Table 4 shows, each lacks many of the 
desired features in each category. A number of omissions stand out for the negative impact they have 
had on encouraging an equitable arrangement. First, the lack of any provisions on groundwater has 
ensured that roughly half of the groundwater within the Yarmouk tributary basin remains wholly 
ungoverned, and also that the thousands of wells that have been drilled are not violations of the 
agreements. The minimal concern for water pollution and biodiversity also likely blocks progressive 
measures that societies in each of the states might push for. The impact is compounded by the absence 
of mechanisms for adapting to change. By specifying the number of dams that can be built, or the purpose 
of a weir, or the precise months by which flows can be exchanged, the agreements were clearly focussed 
on the most immediate challenges facing the negotiators when they were signed in 1987 and 1994. But 
                                                          
17 As was the case with the 1987 Jordan–Syria agreement, violations of Annex II are debatable. The fact that only Israel can 
actually make use of the "excess flood water" of Article I.1c, for example, does not mean that Jordan cannot do so eventually, 
at least in theory. Similarly, the "additional 50 Mm3/y" of Article I.3 may be argued to be more of an (as yet) unfulfilled clause 
than a violation, due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the treaty.  
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the rigidity of the agreements has locked in water resource managers in the subsequent decades, which 
has been a period of constant change in the dependency on, and use of, freshwater resources. 
Table 4. The two bilateral treaties related to Yarmouk flows, compared with the indicative features of a 
model agreement shown in Table 1.  







Based on 'equitable and reasonable use' No No 
Specific, rather than ambiguous Yes No 
Flexible, rather than rigid No No 
Technical mechanisms (related to, for example, conjunctive groundwater and surface water) 
Acknowledgement of surface water and groundwater as part of the same 
transboundary watercourse 
No No 
Adequate accounting for use, amount and quality of groundwater in 
reserve, and its rate of replenishment 
No No 
Common identification, delineation and characterisation of 
transboundary groundwater 
No No 
Appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce the pollution of 
transboundary groundwater 
No No 
Comprehensive water accounting, including use, amount and quality of 
soil water, and gains made through improvements in irrigation efficiency 
(the 'paracommons') 
No No 
Uncertainty mechanisms (related to changes in needs, climate, etc) 
Revisiting clauses No No 
Escape clauses No No 
Institutional mechanisms  
'Prior notification' No Yes 
'No significant harm' No No 
Enforcement clauses No No 
Monitoring provisions No No 
Dispute-resolution mechanisms Yes Yes 
Self-enforcement mechanisms No No 
Creation of multilateral bodies for information exchange or joint 
management 
Yes Yes 
Environmental and health concerns 
Water quality provisions No Yes 
Biodiversity, river base flows, etc. No No 
Source: Based on Hayton and Utton, 1989; UNECE, 1992; Rieu-Clarke et al., 2012; Zentner, 2012; Giordano et al., 2013; Tanzi, 
2013; UNECE, 2013, Dinar et al., 2015; Simons et al., 2015; Jafroudi, 2018. 
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Furthermore, both agreements fall down when tested for equitability of allocation. Here, the case 
analysis reveals several features, quite apart from the fact that neither agreement considers the rights of 
use of downstream Palestinians. The 1987 agreement has Jordan paying for the Wehdeh Dam, but Syria 
receiving three-quarters of the electricity that would have been produced if the hydroelectric component 
of the project had been completed; according to this agreement, Syria also reserves the right to build and 
fill 26 dams upstream from the dam. Israel has used more water from the Yarmouk tributary basin since 
the 1994 Water Annex was signed, despite its access to vastly greater amounts of freshwater from other 
sources in and outside of the Jordan River Basin, the Jordanian – Israeli informal economic and political 
arrangements notwithstanding. Indeed, the allocation mechanisms of neither text consider the legal 
entitlement, or even relative water 'needs' of the states. And in both cases, Jordan's share of the 
transboundary resources is relegated to overflows – or whatever the more powerful side does not use. 
One potential explanation for the poor score of both the agreements is lack of knowledge. They were 
negotiated and signed well before the deposition of the Watercourses Convention at the UN General 
Assembly in 1997, and the authors could not have benefitted from the subsequent decades of research 
on water agreements. Nonetheless, related discussions on water sharing were happening around the 
world at the time of the negotiations, and particularly in relation to the Yarmouk. The Yarmouk tributary, 
for example, was in full focus during the Johnston Mission of the 1950s which debated and advanced 
principles of fair water sharing all the way through to the 1970s.18 Furthermore, there is a centuries-old 
practice of including 'revisiting' and other types of clauses in an arrangement in order to build in flexibility 
by allowing renegotiation after a certain amount of time or under changed circumstances. The regionʼs 
interannual variability in rainfall and river flow were also well known; this variability could have been 
dealt with in the cases at hand by basing the allocation on percentages of available flows rather than on 
fixed volumes. The latter is a particularly salient point, not only because of the highly volatile interannual 
flow of the mainstream, but also because the only country that has signed both agreements is now 'stuck' 
by the rigidity, in the sense that it is wholly unsure of the amount of the flows that will come into the 
Wehdeh Dam, yet is committed to providing a secure supply downstream (see Zeitoun et al. (2019b)). 
Other weaknesses that cannot be attributed to a lack of knowledge are better understood through 
politics. Though no data on motives for signing the agreements was collected for this research, water 
resource managers in Jordan have cited their very weak political position vis-à-vis Syria in 1987 as the 
main reason for their governmentʼs consent. Former Jordanian water minister Haddadin attributes the 
official Jordanian consent to 'higher politics', as well as to the government following the idea of Arab 
brotherhood (Haddadin, 2002; Haddadin, 2017). The previously discussed ambiguity in the Water Annex 
helps explain why Jordanian negotiators would support the water clauses, as noted by Jägerskog (2003: 
118). In any case, reaching agreement on water issues was deemed to be not worth threatening the 
chance to end the official state of war between Jordan and Israel that the peace treaty anchored 
(Haddadin, 2017). 
Seen from a more critical transboundary water analysis, it is worth noting that all aspects of the 
weaknesses of the agreements favour the more powerful state – be they built-in inequality, omissions, 
rigidity or ambiguity. The findings challenge the less critical evaluations of the Israel-Jordan water 
agreement but are in keeping with other analyses on the Jordan River, be it Israeli-Palestinian (Selby, 
2003) or Israeli-Lebanese (Zeitoun et al., 2013; AFIAL, 2014). A more realistic interpretation of the 
agreements would suggest that the more powerful player has a greater ability to set the parameters and 
structures of the negotiations, and hence has the ability to define the terms of the agreement thereby 
benefitting most from the ambiguity, rigidity and omissions. In other words, if there is to be skew in any 
                                                          
18 Debates about the very principle of 'equitable and reasonable use' took place; notably, the 'Baxter Report' was commissioned 
by USAID in 1977 to give a legal opinion on the legitimacy of the Wehdeh Dam. This report concluded that violations of the 
principle of equitable use/apportionment were unlikely because "construction of the dam does not necessarily involve any 
change in present allocations of the basin waters" (Baxter, 1977: 131). 
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agreement, it would be expected to be in favour of the more powerful actor. With an appreciation that 
power asymmetry does not necessarily determine outcomes, Jordanʼs signing of both agreements could 
be read as tactical or strategic moves, if not outright contestation of them. 
The agreements are the problem 
Both agreements are judged to discourage fair transboundary water arrangements, whether through 
omissions or because of rigid or ambiguous clauses. To return to the assertions of the bulk of 
hydropolitical research and policy reports, the Yarmouk agreements are thus not only not evidence of a 
cooperative arrangement, they are in and of themselves part of the problem. However, they are not 
equally problematic to all sides. 
The short end of the agreements may be felt first and foremost by water resource managers in 
midstream Jordan. Regardless of the benefits of any tactical concessions on water by the Jordanian 
government, Jordanian water managers are tasked today with managing a resource that is "impossible 
to manage", as one employee of the Jordan Valley Authority put it (Ghantous, 2018). The difficulties arise 
from the fact that the institution has no physical control over the sources of the Jordan or Yarmouk flows, 
while its legal control is circumscribed by the terms of the international agreements as well as by their 
jurisdiction and design. 
The problems with the jurisdictions of the two agreements goes beyond the issues arising from the 
absence of any regulation of groundwater use. The 1987 agreement, for example, is limited to the 
Yarmouk tributary itself, and so does not include the Golan Heights. The 1994 Water Annex also makes 
no mention of the Golan Heights, though the Yarmouk-related clauses legitimise Israeli water use at their 
foot. The jurisdiction of Annex II also stops at the junction of the West Bank and the Jordan River. 
Jordanian water resource managers are thus impeded by agreements that ignore both the sources and 
the end point of the Yarmouk tributary that flows across its north-western border. Pollution entering 
from the Golan or detected in the Jordan River south of the West Bank affects Jordanian water supplies 
and farmers directly, but neither the international agreements nor the infrastructure or the joint 
committees that they spawned have a mandate to address it. The agreements are thus 'blind' in their 
lack of acknowledgement of actual water use and are of no use in attempting to point out, raise or discuss 
even the most pressing of related issues. The issues that do arise are always dealt with in an ad hoc 
manner, often through promises that remain much less secure and more prone to power asymmetries 
than do the agreements. 
A related part of the impediment that the agreements pose to equitable transboundary water 
arrangements is their original purposes, even their very nature. The goals of the water agreements were 
to build a dam (the 1987 agreement) or to manage a relatively minor component of a much broader 
political treaty (the 1994 Water Annex); their aim was not to ensure 'equitable arrangements', nor even 
to alter the terms of water use that had been established at the time of ratification. At some point before 
or after the agreements enabled the construction of the Wehdeh Dam and the Adassiyeh Weir, they 
became instruments that locked in the arrangements. As explored at greater length in the Zeitoun et al. 
(2019), the agreements also influence the design and operation of the infrastructure. In this way, for over 
a quarter of a century, the written word and concrete have worked hand-in-glove to impede the 
development of an equitable transboundary water arrangement. 
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ANNEX A. TABLE OF YARMOUK – TIBERIAS WATER EXCHANGE DATA 
Table A.1. Distribution of Yarmouk flows after Adassiyeh, showing the balance of the Yarmouk – Tiberias 
'water swap' (in Mm3/y) within data limitations.  
a b c d e f g h i 
Year ^Total flows 
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1962 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1963 93.44 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1964 109.08 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1965 138.94 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1966 133.93 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1967 136.15 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1968 150.54 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1969 97.73 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1970 63.22 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1971 115.86 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1972 149.64 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1973 112.01 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1974 124.57 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1975 125.60 nd nd nd nd nd nd nd 
1976 126.10 nd nd 4.3 nd nd nd nd 
1977 126.78 nd nd 6.8 nd nd nd nd 
1978 128.64 nd nd 13.1 nd nd nd nd 
1979 113.75 nd nd 29.8 nd nd nd nd 
1980 124.23 nd nd 4.5 nd nd nd nd 
1981 128.26 nd nd 4.7 nd nd nd nd 
1982 144.02 nd nd 17 nd nd nd nd 
1983 128.56 nd nd 31.1 nd nd nd nd 
1984 145.12 nd nd 30 nd nd nd nd 
1985 126.39 nd nd 25.8 25.4 21.1 nd nd 
1986 125.92 nd 109.42 54.4 24.4 16.4 nd nd 
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1987 167.90 nd 179.92 18.2 13.4 19.1 nd nd 
1988 144.35 nd 184.67 20.2 3.2 18.5 nd nd 
1989 108.12 nd 50.84 28.3 18.3 22.6 nd nd 
1990 98.4 nd 58.18 32.5 26.0 22.0 nd nd 
1991 95.5 nd 66.42 33.7 32.2 13.9 nd nd 
1992 164.9 nd 613.34 6.8 11.1 11.3 nd nd 
1993 118.5 nd 146.95 17.8 4.3 16.3 6.9 nd 
1994 99.2 nd 67.73 8.9 18.9 12.0 30.8 nd 
1995 124.6 nd 68.70 21.8 9.5 15.6 25.0 21.8 
1996 121.4 nd 55.58 26.9 26.5 14.3 40.8 30.8 
1997 114.7 nd 57.02 26.2 28.3 19.1 47.3 47.4 
1998 102.3 nd 62.98 10.6 20.5 17.8 38.3 55.9 
1999 79.2 nd 28.11 20.8 10.4 12.6 22.9 41.9 
2000 72.5 nd 51.27 20.7 24.9 16.0 40.9 54.5 
2001 50.3 nd 38.36 34.3 23.3 13.1 36.5 45.4 
2002 53.1 nd 58.65 43.8 35.4 12.9 48.3 51.1 
2003 79.1 46.9 465.42 22.0 48.0 11.4 59.4 53.4 
2004 97.4 36.6 172.84 31.1 18.9 14.5 33.4 50.2 
2005 74.7 41.0 59.06 25.0 26.9 15.1 42.0 47.0 
2006 49.1 42.8 45.05 17.1 24.2 15.4 39.6 53.1 
2007 47.8 33.5 35.13 8.7 14.7 15.6 30.3 43.4 
2008 52.0 28.3 30.78 15.3 10.2 15.6 25.9 42.1 
2009 55.0 34.0 40.58 14.2 16.5 13.1 29.6 42.2 
2010 51.9 32.8 33.00 10.9 10.5 16.7 27.2 45.5 
2011 49.6 32.1 32.7 16.1 11.6 15.2 26.8 43.6 
2012 63.2 41.4 51.6 20.2 17.8 16.3 34.1 48.4 
2013 88.5 45.2 76.9 4.5 17.2 19.9 37.1 52.9 
2014 78.5 33.9 33.9 nd 8.8 18.4 27.2 55.1 
2015 91.2 32.4 32.5 nd 9.0 18.7 27.8 48.3 
2016 115.3 34.2 34.4 nd nd nd nd 51.9 
2017 120.8 28.8 28.8 nd nd nd nd 48.1 
2018 109.3 29.9 29.9 nd nd nd nd 49.5 
Avg. 
series 
105 37 94/65  
(if 1992+2003 removed) 





72 / 71.5  






69 / 48  
















Sources: JVA and JVWA, and as noted. 
Notes: Discrepancies are due to measurement error, poor reliability of the reported data, and non-calibration of different 
datasets, as discussed further in the text; nd = no data; AW = Adassiyeh Weir; YR = Yarmoukim Reservoir; KAC = King Abdullah 
Canal. 
* Main databases used are listed; all are checked against JVA (2006), JVA (2016), JVA (2018), and JVA (2019), with minor 
irregularities due to different labels and periods. 
^ JVWA figures differ from HSI figures (Column d), though not significantly over the long run; JVWA figures are retained in the 
article. 
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